









Establecimientos Metalúrgicos Santa Rosa steelworks, founded in 1943, produced 
steels with different alloying elements, such as silicon, along with products of  high 
added value, such as steel wires, for industrial uses.1 Since the late 1930s, Santa Rosa 
steelworks was intertwined with the development of  the Import Substitution In-
dustrialization model that then ruled Argentine economic life. From 1968 to 1979, 
this factory employed almost 3,000 workers.2 The factory developed through con-
tinuous renovations, the modernization of  machinery, and the uninterrupted labour 
of  its workers. The specific industrial regime built in this factory and the union 
practices sustained by the traditional Peronist shop stewards meant that the rela-
tionship between employer and workers was mostly harmonic. However, in the late 
1960s, a movement emerged within the workforce that fought for control of  work-
place union organization. This movement also occurred in other Argentine factories 
at the time. A drop in wages and purchasing power combined with an intensification 
of  production began to generate intense discontent among workers. During a period 
of  intense political instability and social unrest, the traditional Peronist unions fell 
into crisis. 
This article will look at how the Santa Rosa industrial regime and its work-
force’s reaction to changes in the production process contributed to shaping work-
ers’ identity. First, I will review the history of  Peronist unions and scholarly debates 
about the autonomy of  the working class during period in question. Next, I will 
analyze the union bureaucratization process that began in 1958 and the relationship 
between union leaders and rank-and-file members. 
 
I. 
In Argentina, the Juan Domingo Perón presidencies (1946-1952 and 1952-1955) 
encouraged a new type of  relationship between the state, the workers, and the em-
ployers. This relationship was determined by two different regulations: the Decree 
23.852/45, in 1945, set out rules for unions, and the Collective Bargain Law (number 
14.250), in 1953, regulated relationships between social classes. 
The decree organized workers by industry and gave the monopoly of  rep-
resentation to the union with the most members. Therefore, only one union in each 
industry could negotiate with the state and employers while receiving the members’ 
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economic contributions. On the other hand, Law 14.250 institutionalized the rela-
tionships between classes by ensuring that their negotiations were approved by the 
state. This new relationship between the state and social classes reflected transfor-
mations in the economic model and the stimulus that the Peronist government gave 
to the development of  the national market. This economic model is known in Ar-
gentina as Import Substitution Industrialization (Industrialización por Sustitución de Im-
portaciones or ISI).3 
During the first years of  Perón’s government, industrialization increased 
and manufacturing production became the most dynamic element in the national 
economy as more factories opened and developed. Consequently, the industrial 
working class grew considerably and became more powerful as a result of  two ele-
ments. The first was its core economic role both as a producer and as a consumer 
of  the goods that were produced in order to avoid an overproduction crisis. In 
1950, the working class’ share of  the national income reached 47%.4 The second 
element was legislation consolidating a nationally-based and centralized union struc-
ture which ultimately empowered these working-class organizations. 
 At this moment, Argentine unions became very powerful social and po-
litical institutions, owing principally to their economic resources, their ability to mo-
bilize a large number of  affiliates, and their presence at the shop-floor level. As 
historian Victoria Basualdo argues, the existing tradition of  shop-floor organization 
was a key factor in making the Argentine labour movement one of  the strongest 
and most active in Latin America from the mid-1940s to the mid-1970s.5 However, 
many scholars who do not consider shop-floor organization have argued that, under 
Peronism, the working class was weak and reformist, pursuing a conciliation of  in-
terests between classes.6 As a result, scholars have characterized union structures in 
this period as bureaucratic and “based on the passivity of  the rank-and-file.”7 Even 
though some scholars have disproved these analyses—especially Louise Doyon’s 
study—its principles are evident in studies examining the periods spanning 1955-
1958 and 1958-1969.8 Many scholars have linked union leaders’ practices to the ac-
tions of  the whole working class, dismissing struggles on the shop floor where 
rank-and-file members “managed to gain a position of  unprecedented power” and 
overlooking their ability to establish their autonomy from the government.9 Histo-
rian Marcos Schiavi affirmed that even if  workers themselves were politically iden-
tified with Peronism, they managed to keep their autonomy through shop-floor 
union organization.10 
Since the Peronist union legislation stipulated that unions needed state au-
thorization to operate (personería gremial), many union leaders established a very 
close relationship with the state. Therefore, the legislation stimulated the bureau-
cratization of  these workers’ organizations by promoting highly centralized trade 
unionism that was subordinate to the uppermost stratum, and linking union leaders’ 
prestige with their closeness to the state. Thus, union activity and the Peronist move-
ment appear to be intertwined. Many scholars understood that this political alliance, 
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edified by conciliating interests between classes, determined state-citizen relations. 
As historian Eduardo Elena argues, Peronism was conceived as a form of  “social 
citizenship,” that “stoked a sense of  empowerment among working-class Argentines 
that mitigated earlier experiences of  exclusion.”11 Historian Daniel James postulates 
that Peronism proposed a new role in society for the working class because it rec-
ognized the workers as a social class that acted as a collective in the political arena.12 
But, as Elena has remarked, “this approach leaves unanswered crucial questions 
about the meaning of  social citizenship as realized in practice, especially outside 
the much-studied arena of  state-union relations.”13 I agree with Elena, but I ap-
proach this issue from a different perspective: the union’s internal relations. 
 
II. 
Many studies overlook how crucial shop-floor organization was in forming workers’ 
identity and how labour rights, citizenship, unionism, and Peronism were perceived 
and practiced. Workers gave rise to these perceptions on the shop floor with their 
comrades collectively, as a group. Therefore, scholars must re-think James’ priori-
tizing of  the public square over the factory as the place that established the Argen-
tine working class as a political force, especially if  we consider that workers went to 
the public square with their comrades as factory or union groups.14 
The focus on union leaders or on the relations between union and state 
has misled some to believe that rank-and-file members were passive between 1946 
and 1955. James argues that rank-and-file members emerged in the period known 
as the Peronist Resistance (Resistencia Peronista) with the overthrow of  the Peronist 
government and the beginning of  resistance against the military dictatorship that 
took power.15 In this argument, the “passivity” of  the rank-and-file between 1946 
and 1955 vanished without further explanation.16  
The 1955 coup d´état began a period of  political instability and protest in 
which the working class played a very active role. Workers’ power on the shop floor 
had economic implications for their employers when it collided with the productivity 
levels employers were trying to reach. Therefore, the state began disciplining workers 
in the workplace. In the political sphere, banning the Peronist movement made 
unions the only remaining legal Peronist organization, transforming them into pow-
erful political institutions that could mobilize vast numbers of  people to veto dif-
ferent policies. After 1955, democratic and military  governments  faced  two 
problems: what to do with Peronism, and how to balance the forces at play on the 
shop floors. Different strategies were put into practice which generated different 
alliances between social actors as the government relied on unions’ support for sta-
bility. As a result, unions became important organizations in Argentina’s political 
life. 
Studies of  the working class from 1955-1976 approach the issue from dif-
ferent perspectives. One of  them considers the differences within the unions be-
tween the leaders and the rank-and-file, understanding that the actions followed by 
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these organizations did not entirely represent all of  its members. Scholars’ percep-
tions of  this vary based on how they perceive rank-and-file participation. Therefore, 
an analysis of  the relationship between union leaders and workers is very impor-
tant. 
Labour historian Alejandro Schneider argues that during the Peronist Re-
sistance years it is possible to observe the presence of  both inexperienced figures 
and men who experienced union practices during the Peronist government.17 As 
the military dictatorship sought to modify the balance of  forces inside workplaces, 
the Resistance was carried out by workers with different ideologies, not only Pero-
nists.18 As a result, union organization on the shop floor was the target of  attacks 
that sought to impose more efficient production processes. Workers’ reactions to 
the new processes show how rank-and-file members perceived life at the factories 
during the Peronist government. 
According to James, the Peronist Resistance was a defensive answer to the 
repression and provocation that the working class suffered on the shop floor.19 
Workers fought to preserve their rights. James links the action of  rank-and-file 
members with a democratic approach inside the factories. He argues that new union 
leaders, elected in 1956 and later, emerged from the conflicts that took place on the 
shop floors after Perón was overthrown.20 The differences between James and 
Schneider’s arguments illustrate how each understands union dynamics and their 
contradictions after the Peronist Resistance ended. 
The elected president Arturo Frondizi (1958-1962) promoted the use of  
international capital to develop the national industry and market.21 Once again, this 
development was based on the institutionalization of  the relationship between 
classes. Frondizi returned many rights to workers and unions that the military dic-
tatorship had banned. The law of  Asociaciones Profesionales (number 14.455), 
which dictated the union’s internal life in a way very similar to the Peronist decree, 
was approved. The main purpose of  the new accumulation model was the obtention 
of  high profit levels and the rationalization of  new production processes to raise 
the productivity of  each machine. Consequently, strong and centralized unions were 
needed to enssure that the workers would respect what was negotiated during col-
lective bargaining. Argentine workers rejected attempts to discipline them and, in 
1959, a wave of  protests and strikes shook relationships on shop floors between 
the unions and the employers, as well as between the unions and the state.22 Frondizi 
answered by repressing workers.23 As a result, 1959 marked the end of  the Resist-
ance movement and the beginning of  a bureaucratization process within the unions. 
Scholars tend to analyze this process by looking at union leaders and rank-
and-file members in opposition to each other and highlighting the tensions that ex-
isted between the two groups from 1955 to 1976 and beyond. However, focusing 
on this opposition is limiting because scholars omit instances where leaders and 
rank-and-file members worked together in a dependent and dynamic relationship to 
collectively build identity and class conscience. As Ralph Darlington has argued, 
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“the role of  leadership by union militants (…) can be an important variable in an 
understanding of  the dynamics of  the workplace industrial conflict.”24 
James maintains that the 1959 strikes were promoted by an oppositional 
movement within the unions rooted in the legacy of  the Peronist Resistance and 
its “structure of  feelings” showing that the rank and file were extremely confident 
in the power that they held on the shop-floor.25 Unions challenged their leadership 
in two ways: using confrontational methods associated with the Resistance period, 
or by negotiating with the state and employers. Repression in the 1960s forced union 
leaders who had emerged during the Resistance period to reluctantly accept the less 
confrontational position held by some of  their comrades.26 Workers also accepted 
this new union strategy with “increased resignation and passivity” which “formed 
the background of  a bureaucratization process that manifested itself  in a changing 
relationship between leader and rank and file and in a changing attitude of  leaders, 
as well as increasing corruption of  the leaders.”27 According to James, once the Re-
sistance was over, rank-and-file members returned to their previous passivity, leaving 
space for the rise of  a bureaucracy inside the unions with a conciliatory strategy. 
James links the lack of  democracy inside the unions with workers’ retreat from their 
combativeness. James argues that collective agreements signed in 1960 limited the 
workplace union organization, fixed wages to increases in production, and demon-
strated the workers’ passivity: “The union organization in the workplace needed to 
be based on the points that were of  immediate interest to the worker in his task.”28 
In sum, James links rank-and-file members’ passivity to limitations placed on work-
place union organization. 
In contrast, Schneider does not see the events of  1959 as a defeat for the 
union movement but as a transition towards a defensive strategy. For Schneider, 
the bureaucratization process was the consequence of  a “combination of  elements 
of  continuity and rupture with the previous period.”29 Defense of  the union’s cor-
porate interests were an element of  continuity, under completely different economic, 
political, and legal conditions. Schneider makes clear that the rank and file’s demor-
alization process observed by James must be reconsidered. Under the new legisla-
tion, workplace union organization ensured the compliance of  the collective 
agreements on shop-floors. Since the class struggle at every workplace determined 
how the collective bargain was implemented, rank-and-file members were not un-
familiar with or unconcerned about what was negotiated. 
Basualdo argues that collective agreements signed from 1960 onwards 
show that new regulations regarding production’s rationalization and the ruling 
union’s operations on the shop floor successfully combated workplace union or-
ganization.30 However, she does not agree with James about workers’ passivity, ar-
guing, like Schneider, that protests and struggles on the shop-floor level prove that 
the working class was not passive. Rank-and-file protests revealed an active resist-
ance in the form of  factory takeovers that were carried out independently from the 
union leaders.31 
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Analyzing the union’s political and bargaining power from 1958 onwards 
reveals workers’ strong interest in defending their rights. The unions leadership 
could use the threat of  completely stopping industrial production in the country as 
leverage in every negotiation. The union´s strong presence in workplaces and its 
ability to mobilize rank-and-file members made this possible.  Argentine union lead-
ership used both its associational and structural power in the pursuit of  a political 
strategy, which I will look at later in this article.32 
To develop its economic model, Frondizi’s administration needed central-
ized unions that wanted to negotiate. This, among other economic factors and re-
pressive measures meant that less combative union leaders would triumph. Thus, 
as Schneider argues, the defense of  corporate interests acquired a very different 
meaning than it did during the Peronist Resistance. But in the new political and 
legal context, what did it mean to defend union organization? 
The national government’s respect for unions led to the emergence of  
other institutional needs beyond the defense of  the organization. Unions were be-
coming an end in themselves, turning union leaders into guardians of  the organi-
zation’s interests. In this new context, negotiation acted as a tool for defending 
workers’ interests and constructing a solid corporate union identity—which gener-
ated a sense of  belonging amongst the workers—that was encouraged by leadership 
under the new government. Moderate union leaders who wanted to negotiate 
sought to consolidate a strategy for a strong and centralized union with bargaining 
power supported by the new political, economic, and legal context. As Schneider 
pointed out, it was not the apathy of  the rank and file but a change in dynamics 
that helped a bureaucratic leadership develop. Even if  the unions were strengthened 
and centralized like never before, there were internal dissidents and diversified prac-
tices that are worth examining. 
The workplace union organization played a key role in the construction 
of  a corporate identity among workers in Argentina during the second half  of  the 
twentieth century. The presence of  shop stewards—who brought directives from 
union leadership to the factory—undoubtedly operated as a decisive element in the 
construction of  a united workers collective on each shop floor. But how did the 
collective action emerge and develop in each workplace? If  working-class identity 
was already formed, how was the factory worker collective built? What elements 
united factory workers beyond their rank-and-file union organizations? 
 
III. 
On each shop floor, different factors influenced the construction of  a social and 
cultural order specific to each workplace. For example, at the Establecimientos Met-
alúrgicos Santa Rosa, workplace union organization was necessary to construct a 
workers’ collective because the production process obstructed the ability of  workers 
to socialize. Santa Rosa’s roughly 3,000 workers were extremely separated because 
of  the way the production process was structured. The factory had two main pro-
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duction areas with different work paces and salaries: the hot and the cold areas. In-
side these areas, there were different productive sections: steelworks (furnaces, 
where different alloys were produced), rolling, forging, steel-stretching, heat treat-
ments, wire-drawing, and steel-cables sections. Each of  these sections had different 
moments of  rest, although rest was more frequent in the hot area since high tem-
peratures were very difficult to bear. The factory was very large. In 1973 it occupied 
an area of   about 32 hectares with a covered area of   220,000 m2.33 As a result, the 
sociability of  Santa Rosa workers’ was informed by the geography of  production 
reduced to their section. 
As sociologist Michael Burawoy argues, each space and the different fac-
tors associated with each productive process determined how workers and employ-
ers interacted, generating specific political, ideological, and cultural effects on 
individuals. In other words, political and ideological elements that regulated the so-
cial relations of  production were constructed and reproduced in the productive 
process’s organization.34 These regulations and their effects are what is referred to 
as the factory or industrial regime.35 The factory regime also contained the sociability 
guidelines that governed relations between workers. Consequently, the factory as a 
productive space reproduced the class relations that existed in society.  
Workers’ sociability was determined by cultural elements built inside the fac-
tory.36 Certain factors involved in the production process influenced the construc-
tion of  workers’ self-esteem. Positive characteristics built within a group of  workers 
at a factory related to how they understood their work.37 In Santa Rosa, the pro-
duction process was the material basis on which a hierarchy among workers was es-
tablished. This occured both in Steelworks and in all sections where there were 
furnaces; indeed, high temperatures reached during production affected relation-
ships between workers. However, the heat was seen not as a problem but as another 
characteristic of  the work in this factory: 
 
Ramón: Furnaces are red hot, steel melts and runs like water. In sum-
mer, you have to be inside a refrigerator (…) because of  the tem-
perature. 
Interviewer: It made you sick… 
Ramón: It made some sick, I endured it well.38 
 
This way of  perceiving work was related to prestige: workers who had to 
deal with the heat every day were highly regarded. In the social hierarchy built by 
Santa Rosa’s workers, working in the hot area was a positive factor. The salaries of  
those who tolerated working in the heat reflected this value, with a percentage in-
crease that depended on the number of  hours a worker was exposed to the heat 
and the temperatures that worker had to withstand. This benefit did not exist for 
cold area workers.  
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The strategic importance of  each sector to the factories’ overall production 
also marked a difference in the way workers were valued. The hot area ran contin-
uously for 24 hours a day, divided into three shifts. Santa Rosa’s furnaces had to be 
on all day to avoid any solidification of  the steel or delays in production owing to 
the time needed to reach the right temperature whereas the cold area did not need 
to be continuously in production. The productive space not only informed the value 
of  the work, it also impacted relationships and sociability between workers in each 
area. For example, in the Rolling section of  the hot area, each worker contributed 
to the roughing of  the metal until it ended in sheet metal, bar, or wire rod. The 
ingot entered and advanced by train, a journey of  approximately 200 metres, and 
each worker contributed to its roughing. It was a collective work process. The dis-
tribution of  workers in the space along these 200 metres was evidence of  the col-
lective nature of  this work. On the other hand in the cold area, in the Steel-Cable 
section, a worker produced a specific cable as required by each machine. “Everyone 
had their machine, [the worker] was the machinist of  his machine.”39 These material 
determinations also influenced the relationships workers had with employers. As a 
former cold area worker said, “We were all the same but they were two factories in 
one. The hot area and the cold area. It was two factories in one, but not bad cama-
raderie or anything like that. It was the system, it was all different.”40 
The hot area workers had greater bargaining power with the employer in 
comparison to their cold area peers owing to its strategic importance in the whole 
factory’s production process and the way workers united over their collective work. 
In this way, it is possible to assume that the workers of  the hot area would exert an 
influence on politics and trade unionism, over those of  the cold area. 
 
Sometimes in the cold area, we were working normally. Then, there 
came a hot area order: “you must stop working.” We stopped and 
we didn’t know why. Sometimes we stopped because the supervisor 
gave an operator a bad look, but the order came from above, and 
descended, descended, descended. And in [the cold area] we stopped, 
and we did not know why we stopped. (…) We had one comrade 
who was called The Elephant (El Elefante) and he didn’t want to stop; 
the order to stop came from [the hot area], from Rolling, I don’t 
know why it was, and he didn’t want to stop. One guy from Rolling 
came in, “stop or you are a dead man”, “Yes, yes, I stop.” (…) we 
called him The Elephant because he was about two meters tall, and 
he didn’t want to stop, “stop the machine!” He stopped it.41 
 
Apart from the heat, knowledge of  the trade also established a hierarchical 
division among Santa Rosa’s workers. As in many other factories, trade skills were 
valued and respected. When starting work in Santa Rosa, workers learned and ad-
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vanced: “you go climbing, you enter as operator and leave as multiple-officer.”42 
Upgrading often meant a corresponding salary increase. Workers had great respect 
for colleagues who had been there for a longer time and had a greater command 
of  the trade. When possibilities to accumulate more knowledge and experience 
arose because, for example, a partner missed work, replacing him was an important 
event in a worker’s life, “… because it changes you, it changes the way you work. 
You feel different, with a category and that rewards your salary.”43 
In 1965, Establecimientos Metalúrgicos Santa Rosa initiated an expansion 
plan. The expansion was prompted by two major changes in Argentina: the opening 
of  a blast furnace in the country which provided cheaper raw material than what 
could be obtained in the international market, and the economic changes made by 
Frondizi’s administration that expanded the national industry. This expansion ac-
companied a deluge of  hiring by the factory in 1968 and 1969.44 Interestingly, older 
workers trained new workers and freely shared their knowledge of  the metallurgical 
industry.45 Therefore, at least in this respect, a clash between the experienced work-
ers and the newcomers did not exist; on the contrary, some of  the oldest workers 
integrated the newly admitted into the trade and into the existing factory policy: 
 
At that time there was (…) a very important growth of  the enterprise 
as a company (…) And that led to the entry of  many young people 
of  20, 22, 25 years who (…), when entering the factory, we had a 
great influence of  the old comrades who were in the [Peronist] Re-
sistance, including some that came (…) from the Spanish Civil War. 
We began to be taught, let’s say, in the political and trade union as-
pects.46 
 
Ideological, productive, relational, and cultural patterns were transmitted from one 
generation of  workers to the next. The newcomers’ origins strengthened this trans-
mission, as most of  them came from Entre Ríos in the Argentine countryside, be-
cause the company had a policy of  not hiring workers from the area.47 The employer 
tried to maintain a harmonous relationship between classes inside the factory by 
strengthening the workers’ feeling of  belonging to the company in a paternalistic 
way, with a reciprocal relationship.48 Workers were proud to work at Santa Rosa. It 
was the most important metallurgical factory in the area and paid very good salaries. 
Many shops in the neighbourhood gave credit to the workers when they saw the 
company card. It also provided workers with free care in two hospitals, the possi-
bility of  completing education, or the ability to play on a soccer team in inter-factory 
tournaments. 
Workers who came from places without an industrial tradition developed 
a sense of  belonging to Santa Rosa. This relationship represented the values asso-
ciated with class harmony proposed by Peronism. The feeling of  belonging con-
structed expectations and notions of  justice for the workers who had fewer 
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alternatives to propose to what the company’s management dictated. At the same 
time, networks and bonds of  solidarity were created between the workers, both in-
side and outside the factory walls: 
 
It was a motive of  pride for everyone (…) when there was a colleague 
who was constructing his house (…), it was even determined on a 
Sunday, five (…) comrades, those who did not work, would go (…) 
fundamentally when they filled the roof, so everyone was going to 
help him because that is a job that must be done and finish [ed].49 
 
The factory was located in a neighbourhood that grew at the pace of  industrial de-
velopment driven by the arrival of  new inhabitants. They built their neighbourhood, 
either by doing it themselves or by mobilizing to ask the authorities to do so. As in 
many other cases, belonging to the neighbourhood and helping eachother with the 
construction of  their houses contributed to building bonds of  friendship and loyalty 
within the worker’s group. 
This analysis shows that the workers who entered Santa Rosa at the end 
of  the 1960s joined a workers’ group with whom they were immediately connected 
and integrated. The transfer of  knowledge from the old to the new workers, whether 
in professional or political training, strengthened the bonds of  fellowship between 
them. Workers were uprooted and moved into a new community of  industrial work-
ers that extended this bond outside the factory walls. But the production process 
limited the scope of  workers’ sociability to their section. Therefore, workplace union 
organization union held a prominent role in constructing a workers’ collective that 
involved the whole factory. 
 
IV. 
The union played an important role in the construction of  workers’ identity in Ar-
gentina. Argentine unions had a strong presence in the factory owing to the roles 
held by shop steward delegate Bodies (CD for Cuerpo de Delegados), and Internal 
Commissions (CI by its initials in Spanish, Comisión Interna). These workplace or-
ganizations used direct representation to allow for democratic coordination, delib-
eration, and decision-making. To be elected as a shop steward, a worker had to be 
affiliated to the union in his or her industry that had national union status. In the 
case of  Santa Rosa, worker who wanted to run as a shop steward for his section 
needed to be affiliated with the Metallurgical Workers Union (UOM for Unión Obrera 
Metalúrgica). The UOM is only recognized at the national level. Its presence at a re-
gional or local level is through sectionals that depend on the central union. In this 
case, a worker who wanted to run as a shop steward had to be affiliated with the 
local union, the UOM La Matanza sectional. The CD was composed of  all factory 
shop stewards. The CI, on the other hand, only integrated a small number of  shop 
stewards, but was responsible for representing all factory workers before the em-
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ployers. In the UOM, since the CI members were elected by the CD, it is possible 
to say that the hierarchies established among workers affected the CI’s composi-
tion. 
The CI and CD were incorporated into the union structure, transcending 
the walls of  each workplace, to be integrated into a union that operated at both a 
local level—grouping together all the workers of  the same industry who were in 
that region—and a national level. The factory-based union organization held ex-
tensive power because it could interrupt production at any time, which became an 
important tool in the dispute over control of  the productive process. Because of  
this, the government and employers sought to limit the union’s power. At the same 
time, these workplace union organizations were central to the construction of  union 
hegemony and identity. They were the nexus between union initiatives and the work-
ers. It was through them that demands were channeled and transmitted to factory 
workers. 
The Argentine union structure played a key role in the construction of  
workers’ identity at the workplace because it operated both in  large manufacturing 
plants with thousands of  workers and in small neighbourhood workshops, for 
unionized workers, and those not affiliated to the union. Argentine unions in the 
second half  of  the twentieth century were a fundamental part of  workers’ identity; 
as Pablo Ghigliani affirms, the organization mediated workers’ perception of  reality 
and how it might change.50 In this sense, union leaders were an integral part of  the 
worker’s interests. 
Unions, as a reflection of  class conscience and praxis, were also a reflection 
of  class struggle. Considering the regulations that Law 14.455 and the Law of  Col-
lective Bargaining imposed on relations between workers and employers (and on 
union practices), it is easy to understand how unions influenced workers’ identity. 
We must also take into account that these laws were a result of  the class struggle. 
By considering this we avoid an analysis where class consciousness becomes an ideal 
that workers should attain rather than a consciousness that is forged through strug-
gle and not simply acquired. It is important to highlight, as Georg Lukács does, the 
dynamic and contradictory aspects of  the working class’s constitutional process as 
a conscious subject. Lukács points out that the development of  working-class con-
sciousness is a “dialectic journey,” in other words, a process.51 Therefore, the or-
ganization of  workers is a process tied to multiple social and industrial work-based 
factors that act as a determinant of  the working group. In Argentina, this extended 
especially to the CI and CD. The relations between and within classes—governed 
by the logic of  capitalism—influenced individual actions. As a result, the bureau-
cratization process undergone by unions in the 1960s must be reconsidered. Was it 
the passivity of  the rank and file that made it possible? Or was it a communion of  
interests between the rank and file and leadership? The common and collective con-
struction of  those interests inside the class, the unions, and the workplaces made 
the bureaucratization process possible. 
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Union organization at the factory functioned as an assembly, that would 
ensure democracy among workers. However, the notion of  democracy must be 
problematized because there are also power relations and conflicts between workers 
of  the same factory since they do not form a homogeneous group. In this way, 
union organization within the factory was an object of  dispute among workers. In 
a factory like Santa Rosa, where the production process fragmented the workforce, 
it was almost impossible to hold assemblies in which every worker could participate. 
Therefore, direct democracy that was theoretically guaranteed by the assembly would 
be replaced with the deliberations made by the workers’ representatives, that is, the 
section shop stewards. However, their interpretation of  events could determine 
how their peers perceived union negotiations, relationships with the employer and 
workers in their neighbourhood, and the need for a confrontative strategy. There-
fore, it is necessary to analyze the processes of  leadership construction from above. 
 
V. 
Santa Rosa’s industrial development was based on two elements: on the one hand, 
a incessant renovation and modernization of  the machinery and, on the other, the 
uninterrupted workflow of  its workers, the latter the source of  most of  the conflict 
in the plant. In 1968, the employer decided to extend the so-called “American shift” 
model to two sections of  Rolling. This type of  work organization consisted of  work 
teams carrying out an uninterrupted rotation of  shifts, working eight hours per day, 
for five days, and resting for two days. Rest days did not necessarily coincide with 
weekends. Shifts and free days changed every week. The unpredictability of  this ro-
tation made it difficult for workers to rest and impossible for them to establish a 
routine, which damaged operators’ health. Work teams did not work the same shift 
two weeks in a row. As a result, work hours allocated through inconsistent schedules 
determined leisure time and erased the boundary between them. As Paula Varela 
pointed out, the factory ended up administrating the worker’s life.52 The “American 
shift” was used to ensure that the factory would run 24 hours a day and the use of  
rotational shifts allowed the employer to maintain a pace of  production that justified 
the investment in machinery. It also saved the costs associated with paying the night 
shift extra since all work teams were paid the same. 
Workers of  the Rolling section faced the imposition of  these shifts without 
the ability to object. Luis Kergaravat, a worker at the factory, stated:  
 
They imposed it in ‘68. (…) There was resistance, but there was a 
military government, we couldn’t do much because we were all new 
(…) the company had no trouble getting you out of  the way and bye. 
And the old men who were almost at the end of  their ... finally there 
was an assembly and it was accepted. There was resistance in this re-
gard, [but] what happens is that (…) from having a salary of  1,000 
pesos, I went on to collect 1,500, a 50% increase, out of  pocket. 
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Then, there was a notable difference in salary, it was important.53 
 
In this testimony, it is possible to observe that there were workers who tried to resist 
and others who were satisfied with the salary increase applied when the new system 
was established.  
In 1966, a military dictatorship took power that sought to expand Fron-
dizi’s economic model by creating a vanguard sector in the economy rooted in the 
new industries operating in the country since 1958. To achieve this goal, the dicta-
torship established an authoritarian regime that suspended political activity and col-
lective bargaining. Without collective bargaining, trade unionism was unable to 
negotiate or apply pressure by threatening to stop work throughout the whole coun-
try. Furthermore, collective agreements could unite all workers in an industry, 
through the organic and organized unity of  unionism with the consolidation of  the 
dictatorship, unions were unable to apply pressure that forced negotiations. This 
meant that union leaders started to become ineffective because they did not have 
entities to negotiate with. During the dictatorship, the union model that had been 
in place since 1958 went into crisis. 
 During this time, as union leaders became less effective, the “American 
shift” was adopted in Santa Rosa. Disagreements with the employer over the use 
of  the shift evolved into a confrontation with the CD and the CI of  the factory, as 
both organizations agreed with the imposition of  the new system despite the work-
ers’ oppositon. This event was especially important because it caused a crisis of  
representation: “we [realized] that we could not expect (…) any kind of  help from 
the UOM [union], neither local nor at a national level.”54 The agreement between 
the employer, the shop stewards, and the CI disregarded the workers’ demands 
against the “American shift,” producing a conflict of  interest between the union 
and the Santa Rosa workforce. The workers also saw that their claims clashed with 
those supported by the union. The immediate collective interests of  these workers 
did not coincide with the ones established by the union. 
This crisis of  representation forced the resignation of  five members of  
the CI and, later, the entire CD resigned in solidarity. The crisis also affected other 
factories in the area that had similar economic conflicts. As a result, some workers 
at Santa Rosa—along with other metalworkers in the area—issued a document de-
manding that the director of  the local union resign. This had an important effect 
on the union since the workers of  Santa Rosa took their claim to the most-read na-
tional newspaper, Crónica. Although this movement did not come to fruition, this 
event was a significant milestone that constructed an alternative identity in Santa 
Rosa. It showed how a crisis of  the union representation model in one factory ex-
tended to neighbouring factories.  
In summary, the peculiarities of  the production process together with the 
growth of  Santa Rosa established an industrial regime that was based on a pater-
nalistic and reciprocal relationship between workers and employers. These values 
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were consistent with those of  class conciliation propagated by the local union. The 
production process imposed a form of  sociability founded on belonging to a work-
ing section and a hierarchy that gave more prestige to hot area workers and to those 
with greater trade skills. With the entry of  new workers and the imposition of  a 
more intense production pace (the “American shift”), this factory regime entered 
into crisis, revealing the non-reciprocal relations between classes and the political 
and ideological differences within the workforce. This, in turn, resulted in a crisis 
of  representation within the union that had local repercussions and political un-
dertones and brought about a new workers’ identity in Santa Rosa. 
 
VI. 
When Santa Rosa hired a number of  new young workers who lacked metallurgical 
or union experience, the workforce became divided. However, this had been hap-
pening for years. Kergaravat’s testimony highlights a difference between the older 
workers and the new ones. This difference was not a consequence of  exclusion 
from the union model that directly affected younger workers (as Mignon did detect 
in the case of  the Cordoba automakers).55 Santa Rosa’s new workers did not feel 
marginalized by the metallurgical work ladder, by the hierarchies of  sociability in 
the workplace, or by the salary that corresponded to their knowledge of  the trade. 
Rather, the generational difference in the Santa Rosa workforce was related to the 
traditions and conceptual framework workers used to understand their lives, their 
relationships, their actions, and the actions of  other people.  The union model es-
tablished in 1958 experienced a structural crisis because it was difficult to use the 
wage claim as an escape valve for other workers’ demands. Other traditions emerged 
through this gap that already existed in the Argentine labour movement but, owing 
to the strong Peronist identity of  the working class, remained on the sidelines. In 
Santa Rosa, for example, left-wing activists were active. They distributed a Trotskyist 
publication in which they pointed out other complaints, apart from salaries and de-
nounced the CI for not acting according to workers’ interests.56 Thus, the new work-
ers were able to expand their union practices within a broader tradition and ideology 
than those proclaimed by the union. A similar crisis of  representation in workplace 
union organization was also taking place in many other Argentinian factories.57 A 
drop in wages, a decline in purchasing power, and the intensification of  production 
and its rhythms generated intense unrest among workers in a context of  growing 
authoritarianism. 
The authoritarian regime established in 1966 implemented regulations that 
removed traditional channels that institutionalized the capitalist class struggle. It 
abolished political gatherings, wiping out the chance for civil society to organize 
and settle conflicts.58 Guillermo O’Donnell argued, “for a large part of  the bour-
geoisie, the promotion of  [the 1966] coup [d’ Etat] was aimed at solving the great 
problem of  finding a state that would organize more stable conditions for accumu-
lation and more firmly guarantee its class domination.”59 Owing to its political power 
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and its great capacity for both mobilization and intervention in the productive 
process, Argentine unionism became the main obstacle to capitalist accumulation.  
The struggle between classes and within classes grew, generating different 
alliances. These alliances changed based on relationships between different social 
groups, who was able to participate, and the objectives and strategies they were able 
to establish. These changes became more noticeable within the labour movement 
and marked the beginning of  a dispute over the meaning of  the union, its obliga-
tions, the role of  its representatives, and its forms of  action. In this dispute, the in-
fluence of  leftist and/or combative Peronist militants was significant. The conflict 
spanned all levels of  union organization. Moreover, the struggle for control of  
workplace organizations was extremely important to the class struggle in general; 
actions or conflicts that occurred in the factories could—and indeed did—directly 
affect capitalist production. 
Different scholars have focused on disputes between workers and union 
leaders when analyzing the increase in union centralization and bureaucratization.60 
However, restricting this analysis to a binary opposition between the rank and file 
and the leadership limits our ability to see the process as a whole. First, because not 
all the workers opposed their leaders—many of  them continued to support them 
over the years. Secondly, this binary perspective does not focus on the arguments 
themselves, which then blurs the different dynamics and people involved with the 
process. Thirdly, focusing on the opposition obscures the common elements be-
tween union leaders and workers. And fourthly, as binary analyses tend to homog-
enize the rank and file, the radicalization process becomes more difficult to 
understand. 
Members of  the union disputed how to undertake the class struggle. 
Therefore, we must understand how conflicts developed within the union, looking 
at the problem of  representation and not at the representatives themselves. Chang-
ing the leader in question did not resolve growing complaints because union mem-
bers disagreed over the concept of  representation. Furthermore, since the working 
class had evolved a specific notion of  citizenship, this crisis of  representation must 
also be understood as ideological. Argentine trade union practices in the second 
half  of  the twentieth century were influenced by Peronist ideology and its proposal 
for class harmony.  With the banning Peronism, unions remained the only legal 
means of  organization of  that political movement. Consequently, during the few 
periods in which the democratic system was restored, it was partial and lacked le-
gitimacy.61 Therefore, Argentine trade unionism was the virtual political represen-
tation of  the Peronist segments of  the population, which allowed it to develop great 
political power. As a result, striking became a tactical device to influence govern-
ments. This strategy transformed unions into decisive actors in the conflict between 
different fractions of  the bourgeoisie. 
Workers’ understanding of  the movement and of  what it meant to be a 
Peronist differed. Their understanding was influenced by the characteristics of  each 
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factory regime because workers’ identity and their perceptions of  reality were built 
in the workplace. Argentine democracy after 1955 determined how the notion of  
citizenship was constructed among workers.62 In the post-1955 context, owing to 
the role that trade unionism adopted with the proscription of  Peronism, workers’ 
political participation consisted of  rank-and-file organizations—both CD and CI.63 
Argentine workers’ civic participation was not related to the liberal notion of  a cit-
izen, or a vote, or to parliamentary representation. It was based on the power of  
association, on a vote amongst peers. This process built an identity and a specific 
sense of  belonging. The construction of  citizen culture and the identity of  workers 
in Argentina was rooted in trade unionism during a time of  democratic instability. 
Workers’ class-based citizenship was formed in a dialectical way, mixing, on one 
side, elements of  liberal representation and democratic citizenship, and, on the other 
side, elements of  corporate association, assembly, direct democracy, and mobiliza-
tion. As a result, citizenship was understood and exercised collectively.64 
Workers became separated when Santa Rosa’s workplace union organiza-
tion and the local union did not support rank-and-file members’ actions against the 
“American shift.” Different ideas about what a union should represent emerged 
within the workforce. This dispute over worker and union identities was evident in 
factories startup in 1968. 
VII. 
A rank-and-file movement emerged from this representation crisis over control of  
workplace union organization. This happened in other factories as well, but each 
dispute was unique.65 The rank-and-file movement gained vitality after the Cor-
dobazo events, when a mass labour uprising took place in the city of  Córdoba on 
May 29, 1969. Workers from metalworking factories mobilized with students and 
took over the city for two days, acting autonomously from their leaders.66 The Cor-
dobazo is remembered as the start of  a surge in protest actions that went beyond 
the traditional channels and direction of  union organization. However, in December 
1968, although with slightly less intensity, metallurgical workers from La Matanza 
protests had shaken local union bases. James mentions a series of  elements that 
made classism viable in Córdoba’s trade unionism underlining the displacement of  
negotiations on wages and working conditions at the company level, and suggested 
that rank-and-file members were better able to oppose union leaders in workplace 
unions than in traditional unions.67 He also highlights the special assimilation of  
the factory in Córdoba and its capacity to influence the population, which, according 
to him, was much greater than it was in the area around Buenos Aires.68 
It was possible to find the features that James lists in many factories 
throughout the Buenos Aires area during the period. First, the suspension of  col-
lective bargaining in 1967 meant that the dispute over wages and working conditions 
was transferred to the factories, which took it away from the national and local 
union leadership. Second, although the capacity to oppose union leaders in work-
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place unions was greater than in traditional unions such as the UOM, we must con-
sider how the dictatorships’ labour policy weakened unions and opened the door 
to opposition. Finally, La Matanza was a neighbourhood built by workers, aban-
doned by the State, and governed by industry practices, so it did not diminish work-
ers’ solidarity. However, even if  a conflict in a factory in this neighbourhood did 
not escalate to become a local or civil rebellion—as happened in Córdoba with the 
Cordobazo—the bonds of  solidarity formed both inside and outside the factory, 
between co-workers, family members, and neighbours, could provide the necessary 
support to face a situation of  prolonged labour conflict. In short, it is impossible 
to ignore the existence of  dissention among rank-and-file members in the Buenos 
Aires suburb, their opposition to the union leadership and the way they confronted 
employers. However, the level of  opposition and confrontation in La Matanza was 
lower in comparison to that in Córdoba. Therefore, we must consider the structural 
conditions that framed and favoured the growth of  confrontation along with the 
presence of  trade union opposition that had been established years before.  
The Cordobazo events and the development of  an opposition affected 
union leadership’s attempts to centralize and control the union. For example, the  
La Matanza UOM leaders opened a trade union training school to spread its vision 
of  politics and unionism among the young workers. Nestor Mazzone, an old worker, 
was the head teacher of  this school. Mazzone’s extensive background in combative 
union political strategies was a key factor in the generational transmission of  polit-
ical, union, and combative labour matters. As a teacher, Mazzone integrated young 
workers into a political tradition of  struggle and direct action, one based on factory 
organization such as that held during the Peronist Resistance. Following the impo-
sition of  the “American shift” in two sections of  Rolling, a group of  young workers 
from Santa Rosa along with metallurgical workers from neighbouring factories 
started to attend this school. A worker and student at the school stated: 
 
The union, they put an advisor on us so that (…) trying to 
influence the shop stewards to lower down a bit. In reality, it 
was the opposite because the man who came, Néstor Maz-
zone (…) was from the old school, from the school of  the 
1950s, who was used to the struggles of  the 1950s, even be-
fore. He was a grown man, old, I think that when he was with 
us he must have been 60 years old…69 
 
The opening of  the trade union school, the election of  Mazzoni to lead it, and the 
organizational and political principles it fostered among young workers demonstrate 
how rich this stage of  political and ideological convergence was. 
The school was established to continue the dissemination of  political and 
identity-forming traditions built by the union. Initially, its purpose was to include 
younger workers in this identity. However, the reinterpretation of  historical mile-
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stones that these workers were creating ended up placing them in opposition to the 
union. Consequently, the creation of  the trade union training school sought to chan-
nel the youngest workers into the union’s official line of  action to distance them 
from the oppositional tendencies of  both the left and the older workers. However, 
this was not the outcome. A space for the rich exchange of  ideas was opened up, 
one that favoured forging links and networks outside the union. Leftist groups had 
also tried to do this since the mid-1960s.70 Descamisados, a group of  Peronist Youth 
with urban guerrilla tactics that worked in different neighbourhoods, had actively 
participated in the trade union school as well.71 As a former Santa Rosa worker ex-
plained: “There were a lot of  boys together, young people, not only from Santa 
Rosa but from other factories as well, and we were getting in touch with the other 
colleagues from the other factories.”72 With this confluence of  workers, the idea of  
creating an inter-factory group to challenge local union leadership emerged.73 
 
VIII. 
In May 1973, the Peronist movement returned to government with the election of  
Héctor Campora as president. The era of  social unrest that had started in 1955 had 
weakened state institutions and increased the amount of  violence in society, includ-
ing in unions and politics. As a result, the new government worked towards strength-
ening the state. It implemented economic policies—agreed upon by the State, the 
unions, and the employers—that controlled wages and prices and contained inter-
sectoral bids for the distribution of  income. This policy was meant to “discipline 
the conflicts between capital and labour” by institutionalizing the class struggle.74 
Consequently, it implemented a Social Pact (Pacto Social) based on the empower-
ment of  legitimate political actors that could contain the class struggle. Corporate 
associations had toguarantee that their members would comply with the signed 
agreement. This meant that unions had to be strong, united, and internally in agree-
ment. These policy changes shone light on the crisis and contradictions of  political 
forces in society and within the Peronist Movement. 
Traditional Peronist unionism had serious difficulties containing and in-
stitutionalizing the class struggle. The union was a key organization in the govern-
ment’s political design and was one of  the main spaces where social tension was 
manifested. This tension increased with the emergence of  new political identities 
and new collective actors that re-signified the image of  the first Peronism, associ-
ating it with new meanings and charging its return to government with expectations 
far away from Perón’s political project. Consequently, the crisis of  Argentina’s union 
model in 1970 was incorporated into the Peronist Movement, making the existing 
class struggle even more complex. 
At the time, Montoneros, the most important Peronist urban guerrilla, 
founded the Peronist Working Youth (JTP for Juventud Trabajadora Peronista), an or-
ganization that sought to renew the unions that had stripped them of  bureaucratic 
practice.75 The JTP had a different conception of  Peronism than that expressed by 
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union leadership. And, although the JTP agreed with traditional union leadership 
about the reconciliation of  classes, it had a different notion of  workers’ rights and 
fair practices allowing them to fight for workers. 
In September 1973, the inter-factory metalworkers’ group from La 
Matanza emerged as a union group named Mussy-Retamar in honour of  two met-
alworkers from La Matanza who had been killed by police repression in 1965. 
Mussy-Retamar declared itself  a member of  the JTP, although not all of  its mem-
bers were Peronists. Its main objective was to control all of  the workplace union 
organizations in La Matanza’s metallurgical factories. Their representatives within 
Santa Rosa ran for shop steward elections, but the local union executed various ma-
neuvers to obstruct the election of  shop stewards who were not loyal to it. For ex-
ample, the election took place in the union building and workers were called to vote 
at very inconvenient times. Furthermore, since the vote was not anonymous, many 
workers feared that the employers or the union would retaliate against them for 
voting against union shop stewards. However, some workers still voted for shop 
stewards with ties to union leaders because they did not want to confront an em-
ployer that they appreciated:  
 
There is a time in which (…) Santa Rosa, the time of  66 or 68, 69, 
70, 71, 72, were times of  glory for us (…)because to begin with I 
earned very well (…) you had a lot of  overtime, you worked full, full 
time, uh (…) I had no drama at all (…) the quality of  people was 
different because (…) 73 onwards was totally a radical change.76 
 
As a result, by 1973, when Peronism returned to the presidency, Santa Rosa workers’ 
opinions on their immediate union leaders were divided. Former worker Francisco 
Calvo explained: 
 
At that time there were two factions, (…) the official White List (…) and us 
who were young boys, twenty shop stewards, out of  a total of  sixty (…). There 
were permanent internal confrontations and we lost by twenty votes in the 
Shopstewards’ Body when voting (…) then we came to negotiate for “el Ruso” 
[Carlos Gdansky] to enter the CI (…) because he was clear in his proposals 
and was more conciliatory with the White List.77 
 
In June 1973, for the first time, representatives of  Mussy-Retamar won all 
of  the factory’s CI positions and implemented a new dynamic for calling assemblies 
to counteract the division among workers generated by the productive process. This 
meant that “every time there was a problem, to avoid delays if  it was not possible 
to gather the CI at that time, an ‘internal representation’ that replaced the CI with 
the shop stewards that were there was constituted.”78 Since Santa Rosa was the 
biggest metallurgical factory in the neighbourhood, the success of  an oppositional 
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CI was a great challenge to the local union.79 The majority of  the union’s delegates 
worked at Santa Rosa and became a key force in the local union and for all the fac-
tories in the area. The combative new CI in Santa Rosa undertook different protest 
actions against the employer. However, some workers associated protest actions 
with not wanting to work. Even with the CI in the Opposition’s hands, the dispute 
over workplace union organizations continued and, by 1974, the CI was composed 
of  five members who were union supporters.  
The factory regime determined Santa Rosa workers’ support—or lack 
thereof— for the union opposition. Basualdo argued that the working class did not 
have a single response to the offensive against the workplace union organizations 
carried out by the employers and the state.80 She suggests that two main strategies 
within different sectors of  the working class became increasingly visible on the 
shop-floor: firstly, a strategy that did not question structural relations and sought 
to negotiate with the employers and the government, and secondly, a strategy that 
promoted confrontation and open struggle to achieve radical transformation.81 Ba-
sualdo, however, argues convincingly that political division is not sufficient to ex-
plain this. She analyzes the evolution of  shop-floor militancy and organization in 
two case studies (the Alpargatas textile factory and Acindar the steel mill), associ-
ating them with the strategies described above, asking why different union positions 
were supported by workers. Although the elements that Basualdo lists as reasons 
for the consolidation of  each position are pertinent and clearly justified, the fact 
that these cases are from two different industries suggests that labour and union 
positions were closely related to the industry to which workers belonged much more 
than the other factors that she lists, such as the history of  rank-and-file organization 
and combativeness in each workplace. By this, I am refering especially to the differ-
ences in their industrial regimes beyond the fact that they produced different goods. 
Industrial regimes determine, among other things, the construction of  
workers’ subjectivity. The relationship with the employer, in this sense, is very im-
portant. This relationship helps explain the predisposition of  a group of  workers 
towards confrontation or combativeness instead of  conciliation in the workplace. 
Basualdo affirms that different views on class identity (confrontation or conciliation) 
and the relations between workers and employers were present within each individ-
ual. That such opposing perspectives in the working class existed underscores Ba-
sualdo’s definition of  class relations that combined opposing interests with mutual 
interdependence. Basualdo states that because the classes are defined by each other, 
worker identity was forged by capital. Workers’ identity was dependent on whether 
or not they felt a sense of  belonging when working in the factory. I argue that we 
must expand this argument to account for the possibility that workers’ identity, and 
the political and union perspectives of  the working class, were collectively constructed 
within the workplace, resulting in something more than the addition of  differentiated 
goals. Similarly, although different production processes’ influence on workers’ iden-
tity is undeniable, it should be noted that the factors associated with production are 
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not immutable, but are a historical phenomenon in a state of  constant change. Fi-
nally, while the factory constitutes a specific social order, it is not an isolated entity 
it was inserted into a territory with quite diffuse borders where it also played a key 
role in building worker identity. 
 
IX. 
In Santa Rosa, employers’ implementing of  the “American shift” revealed to some 
workers the non-reciprocal relationship between social classes. For others, in con-
trast, stopping production was wrong because doing so harmed the enterprise with 
which they connected their own value. However, in November of  1974 a conflict 
broke out that lasted more than twenty days and garnered the support of  all factory 
workers. Although union policy divided the workers, they were eventually united 
by their dissatisfaction over the salaries proposed by the employer. The production 
process was different in each area and section of  the factory, and many workers 
still supported traditional union leaders. 
The conflict of  November 1974 began with a dispute over the application 
of  the new Labour Contract Law that established new parameters regarding salaries 
and days of  rest. Workers did not think that the remuneration they received for 
their work was fair. They believed that the company had dismantled their reciprocal 
relationship by not compensating their efforts accordingly. A letter on October 23 
from the Secretary-General of  the local union to the Minister of  Labour made it 
clear that the majority of  workers endorsed this claim. In the letter, he urgently re-
quested the definition of  the scope of  the law since “the restlessness existing in the 
personnel of  the factory (…) is skillfully being agitated by the professionals of  the 
discord and the division.”82 Following the receipt of  this letter, an investigation was 
opened by the Ministry of  Labour during which the employer, citing the 1968 agree-
ment with the CI, explained that the application of  the new law was not valid. On 
Thursday, November 7, the Ministry of  Labour notified the employer, the union, 
and the workers that there would be an inspection the following week to settle the 
matter, and asked them to keep everything in its current state. However, on Saturday, 
November 9, the Wire-Drawing section initiated a strike, “because they did not 
want to pay the hours. After 1:00 p.m. they had to pay 100% (…) the conflict 
erupt[ed] automatically in the entire factory.”83 The strike began just before the shift 
changed at 2:00 p.m., which allowed the workers of  the two shifts to hold an as-
sembly. “Then assemblies were made by sectors and in all the assemblies, the em-
ployees supported the strike. On Monday a general assembly of  all workers was 
made and it was decided that all sections were going to join the strike.”84 The strike 
was carried out inside the factory without any tasks being performed.  Starting the 
strike at the end of  the morning shift was intentional; the shop stewards of  this 
section—who sympathized with the Mussy-Retamar group—considered the prox-
imity of  the shift change which enabled the gathering of  many workers. The strike 
also began at a time when many of  the members of  the CI were not working, al-
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lowing the shop stewards belonging to the Mussy-Retamar group to immediately 
activate the new organizational dynamics, forming the internal representation as an 
alternative to the CI. 
The “American shift” continued to be important to Santa Rosa workers 
for at least six years. During thie 1974 strike, demands were framed within the pa-
rameters of  one of  the recently sanctioned laws, demonstrating that the workers 
and their leaders understood the new regulation. This strike also showed the im-
portance of  the relationships between workers and political groups, the presence 
of  political activists in the factory, and the important links with other metalworkers 
in the area. For example, in March and July of  that same year, workers from two 
neighbouring metallurgical factories—Insud and Martín Amato—also entered into 
conflict without the support of  the union and triumphed. 
On November 12t, Santa Rosa workers’ level of  combativeness was evi-
dent when the employer denounced that the morning shift staff  had forced them 
to turn off  the furnaces and to incapacitate the plant electrical services.85 However, 
on November 13, the Minister declared the strike illegal because it was neither de-
creed nor approved by any organic body of  the union.86 As well, the Santa Rosa 
CI, two days after the start of  the conflict, ratified everything that the union had 
negotiated in order to proceed with the claim using administrative means and not 
direct action. The differences between the workers and the local union are very ap-
parent. This is important to analyze because it outlines how Santa Rosa workers ex-
perienced the disparity between their immediate collective interests and the interests 
of  their union representation during the course of  events. Additionally, on Novem-
ber 15, a statement from the local union urged workers to end the strike. Clashing 
perceptions within the union about what was fair and what was not forged specific 
aspects of  Santa Rosa workers’ collective identity in November 1974. 
The political formation and militancy of  some workers surely shaped their 
actions and decisions during the conflict. However, analyzing the development of  
events, it becomes evident that the actions of  workers were a consequence of  in-
ternal factory processes. According to the magazine Evita Montonera, the Mussy-Re-
tamar group of  Santa Rosa distributed a flyer inside the factory in which they called 
on workers to form a Fight Committee, following an example set by the workers 
of  the Martín Amato factory.87 The flyer, did not criticize the attitude of  the union. 
These activists were able to see that among the workers there was still a consensus 
about the direction of  the local union and that linking the conflict with intra-union 
relations would decrease its force. 
After one week of  the strike, the police evicted workers from the factory. 
Next, the striking workers decided to hold a massive demonstration outside aimed 
at the union where, after assembling, they found no support. The striking workers 
then resorted to asking the Peronist party for support. However, the Peronist party 
also did not support their cause. The striking workers sent emissaries seeking work-
ers’ solidarity from other factories, which soon arrived. 
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The conflict finally concluded on December 6, with an agreement between 
the parties. The employer recognized all workers’ claims and promised to pay for 
the days not worked. This was a great triumph for the workers of  Santa Rosa. The 
most important part of  this agreement, however, was establishing new leadership 
in the factory. As former worker Calvo stated: 
 
The people provoked a coup d’etat and we achieved the res-
ignation of  all the shop stewards when we return[ed] from 
the strike, when we were negotiating, we achieved the [pay-
ment of  the] non worked days, and the people in an assembly 
of  the whole factory requested the head of  all the shop stew-
ards, of  course, that [was] prompted by us ... all shop stewards 
resigned (…) and the twenty young boys put together a list 
and [won] in all sections.88 
 
Therefore, it is possible to conclude that—during the conflict—the immediate col-
lective interest of  the workers of  Santa Rosa was extended to include strong critics 
of  the union leadership. For this reason, new representatives in the rank-and-file 
organization were elected. Those who gained respect as leaders during this conflict 
later became members of  the CI that prioritized these new collective interests. Al-
though some of  them were already leaders of  their section colleagues, they became 
leaders of  the factory thanks to the new workers’ identity produced by the events. 
Many of  these leaders had previous militant labour and political experience outside 
the factory. Nevertheless, it was only the internal process involving all Santa Rosa 
workers that had allowed them to become workplace leaders. 
 
Conclusion 
Looking at the forming of  the Santa Rosa workers’ collective bodies and identity 
during the second half  of  the twentieth century has shown the way in which the 
industrial regime determined how class was constructed in each workplace. The 
production process shaped how workers related to each other and with the em-
ployer, which in turn affected the construction of  hierarchies and perceptions of  
reality that were always determined collectively. 
In the case of  Santa Rosa, the reciprocal relationship established with the 
employer stopped some workers from adopting a confrontational attitude. But, with 
the introduction of  a new shift system, some of  these workers understood that this 
reciprocal relationship was over. The new ‘American shift’ system produced a crisis 
of  representation for shop stewards and the local union thereby consolidating an 
oppositional movement inside the factory. This movement could only achieve the 
support of  the entire workforce once differences between the workers, the union, 
and the employer’s interest became evident to the workers. 
Analyzing how the workers’ collective identity was constructed in the 
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workplace has enriched our understanding of  trade unionism and the Argentine 
working class in that period. Through this analysis, it became evident that rank-and-
file members were not a homogeneous group, a finding that helps us detach from 
a binary analysis of  unionism that sees it only as a dichotomous opposition between 
rank-and-file members and leadership. This relationship was not in fact only gov-
erned by confrontation. Thus, we can better understand how the working class rad-
icalized in the late 1960s by observing many workers’ attempts to change the union 
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